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THE EX-CONVICT'S RIGHT TO VOTE
In recent years state laws limiting effective exercise of the franchise have
been consistently invalidated by the United States Supreme Court.' Trends
in penological theory have at the same time stressed the value of encouraging ex-convicts to assume the role of responsible citizens.2 Countering
the aims of both lines of development are state constitutional and statutory
provisions disfranchising persons convicted of various classes of crime. 8
An example is article II, section 1 of the California Constitution which,
after setting out residence and citizenship requirements, prescribes:
No idiot, no insane person, no person convicted of any infamous crime, no
person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public
money, and no person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in the
English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges
of an elector in this State.
The constitutionality of disfranchising persons convicted of an "infamous
crime" 4 was challenged in the case of Otsuka v. Hite.5 Infamous crimes had
formerly been construed by the California Supreme Court to include all
felonies,6 but the court, in a 4-3 decision, redefined the term to include
only "crimes involving moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding
their perpetrator as a threat to the integrity of the elective process." 7 The
court acknowledged that "the state must show it has a compelling interest
in abridging the right [to vote], and that, in any event, such restrictions
must be drawn with narrow specificity."8 The court's recognition of equal
protection limitations on disfranchisement and its implicit consideration
of current penological theories are the virtues of the decision.
But the dissent noted an obvious shortcoming: "By what standard is
the Registrar of Voters to determine whether one convicted of crime is
I Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Harman v. Forssenius, 880 U.S. 528

(1965).
2 RuBiN, Tnn L~w oF CRimiNAL CORRECriON 622 (1963); SUTHEL AND & CREssEY,
PRCIPLmS OF CRmINOLOGY 590 (5th ed. 1955). See generally A Symposium of Crime and
Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 585-783 (1962).
3 In nearly every state persons convicted of certain classes of crimes are disqualified
from voting. See, e.g., Bruno v. Murdock, 406 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. 1966); McGOVNEY, THE
A.mEmcAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 53-54 (1949); RuBIN, Op. cd. supra note 2.

CAr CoNsr. art. II, § 1.
5 64 Adv. Cal. 652, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 414 P.2d 412 (1966).
6 Matter of Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 189 Pac. 674 (1914); Truchon v. Toomey, 116
Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864,
338 P.2d 182 (1959).
7 Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Adv. Cal. 652, 667, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 294, 414 P.2d 412, 422
4

(1966).
8id. at 658, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 288, 414 P.2d at 416.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
thereby branded as a 'threat to the integrity of the elective process'? Or
whether the crime involved 'moral corruption and dishonesty'? For example, would murder qualify?" 9 The dissenting justices would have avoided
these problems by continuing to restore the right to vote to an ex-convict
only upon his obtaining a pardon.' ° Neither the majority nor dissenting
justices suggested' that the entire provision should have been declared unconstitutional-a conclusion which would have promoted more fully socety's interest in the rehabilitation of criminals as well as avoiding numerous
practical problems resulting from the decision.
Otsuka v. Hite raised for the first time as a central issue the construction
of "infamous crime" as used in the California Constitution. l The plainOld. at 671, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 297, 414 P.2d at 425.
101Id. at 674, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 299, 414 P.2d at 427. There may be restoration of
the right to vote to persons convicted of crime in California either by court order
upon completion of probation under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 or, if a prison term was
served, by executive pardon after completion of rehabilitation proceedings pursuant to
CAL. PFN. CODE §§ 4852.01-.17.
Both opinions ignore problems which arise under the above procedures. Where a
person is convicted of a crime in another state which is a felony in both California and
the other state, the practice has been to deny him the right to vote in California unless
he is granted a full pardon by the other state. A procedure by which the other state's
governor restores the ex-convict to all civil rights was insufficient to restore his right to
vote in California. Letter from Edward H. Gaylord, Assistant County Counsel, Los Angeles County, to Benjamin S. Hite, Registrar of Voters, March 9, 1966. Such a practice
was based on the theory that the governor of another state was powerless to restore
rights taken away by the California Constitution. Only if the governor of the other state
expunged the conviction by means of a full pardon would the person convicted be able
to vote in California. This practice is no longer followed. Now the registrar, in appraising whether or not a person would be a threat to the elective process within the spirit of
Otsuka, may accept a certificate signed by the governor of another state restoring the
rights of citizenship to an ex-convict as good evidence of his rehabilitation. Letter
from Edward H. Gaylord, Assistant County Counsel, Los Angeles County to Benjamin
S. Hite, Registrar of Voters, June 21, 1966.
Another problem with the administrative procedures for regaining the right to vote
is the time involved in carrying them out. Under § 4852.03 of the Penal Code a notice
of intention to file for a certificate of rehabilitation must be filed. Dating from that
time a period of rehabilitation begins to run. The period is three years plus thirty days
for each year of the maximum term prescribed for the crime for which the person was
convicted regardless of the time for which he was actually sentenced. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 4852.03. Thus, a person convicted of rape, for which the maximum term is fifty years,
would have to wait over seven years following release from prison and parole before
he could apply for such a certificate entitling him to be restored to his right to vote.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 261. The federal procedures for an executive pardon to which plaintiffs in Otsuka would be subject take three to five years depending on the crime. 28
C.F.R. § 1.3 (1962).
11 In Matter of Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 139 Pac. 674 (1914), the court stated:
"Crimes are infamous either by reason of their punishment or by reason of their nature.
In the first class fall all felonies.... At common law crimes which rendered the person
doing them infamous were treason, felony, and the crimen falsi."
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tiffs were convicted of violations of the Selective Service Act12 during World
War II. 13 These convictions were determined by the Los Angeles County
Registrar of Voters to be convictions for infamous crimes which disqualified them from voting. They brought an action to compel their registration; 14 the superior court, and lower appellate court, denied relief to
the plaintiffs finding that any felony described by a federal statute is an
infamous crime, rendering a person convicted under the statute ineligible
to vote in California. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the plaintiffs had not been convicted of an infamous crime.
The plaintiffs contended that the provision was unconstitutional on
several grounds. First, they argued that the provision imposed further
The relevance of using the definition of infamous crime found in Westenberg is
doubtful. That case involved a question of jurisdiction in a prosecution for criminal
libel. The court found that the crime, not being a felony, was not infamous by reason
of its punishment and, not being included among the crimen falsi, was not infamous
by reason of its nature. id. at 319, 139 Pac. at 679. (The crimen falsi included offenses
involving falsehood, particularly those which injuriously affected the administration of
justice.) Definition of infamous crimes as crimes subject to an infamous punishment has
relevance in a criminal prosecution where it is proper to consider the seriousness of
punishment in light of the offense committed. In determining who is to be eligible to
vote, however, seriousness of punishment for a person's crime has no apparent relation
to his fitness.
In the second case construing the provision in question, Truchon v. Toomey, 116
Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), the court accepted the definition found
in Westenberg of "infamous crime" as any crime subject to an infamous punishment.
Truchon was concerned with voter qualification, but the decision rested on construction
of the word "convicted" and not of the term "infamous crime."
The third case which is cited as authority for all felonies being within the definition
of "infamous crime" is Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959). Without
elaborating, the court in Stephens cited Westenberg and accepted the definition therein
of an infamous crime. This third case demonstrated that California courts had, by their
tacit acceptance, construed "infamous crime" in article II, section 1 of the California
Constitution as a crime subject to an infamous punishment-a felony. Nevertheless the
force of such judicial acceptance is diminished by the fact that such construction was
not made an issue in either Truchon or Stephens.
12 Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894.
13 Katsuki Otsuka, a Quaker, was classified as IA-O: a conscientious objector subject to service in the armed forces as a non-combatant. He felt, however, that by reason
of his religious training and belief he could not perform military service of any kind,
and that he should have been classified as 4-E: subject to work of national importance
under civilian direction. The draft board refused to reclassify him, and he surrendered
himself to the New York District Attorney. Plaintiff Abbott was also a conscientious
objector but was classified by his draft board as 4-E. Having been called for work of
national importance he complied; but he thereafter left the civilian public service camp
to which he was assigned because it appeared to him that this camp was an integral
part of the war and that he could not participate. Both men pleaded guilty to violations
of the Selective Service Act and were convicted in federal court. Both were sentenced to
the federal penitentiary where they served their terms and were duly released. Otsuka v.
Hite, 64 Adv. Cal. 652, 655-56, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287, 414 P.2d 412, 415 (1966).
14 CAL. ELEcrnONS CoDE

§ 550.
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punishment on persons already convicted of crimes. Since plaintiffs were
convicted and punished for a crime by a federal court, the power of Cali15
fornia to impose additional punishment was questionable. Second, they
violated
Constitution
argued that article II, section 1 of the California
the fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection
of law. They contended that the provision was overbroad and an unreasonable classification in its inclusion of all felonies as disqualifications, and
overbroad in time, since it disqualifies a person from voting permanently.
Third, plaintiffs urged that modern penological principles which stress
16
are inconsistent
rehabilitation of the criminal rather than punishment
with permanent disfranchisement.
The court rejected the first argument, interpreting the provision as a
non-punitive disqualification. This interpretation is consistent with that of
courts in other states with similar provisionsYt The United States Supreme
Court has also held that the denial of the right to vote is not the imposition of a penalty.' 8
The contention that the provision was overbroad in time since it permanently disqualifies persons included within its terms was also rejected
by the court. 19 Because there are administrative procedures for regaining
25 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Dependent on the success of the argument
that the disfranchisement constituted a punishment was the argument that it was a
cruel and unusual punishment. Brief of Appellant, pp. 24-42, Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Adv.
Cal. 652, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 414 P.2d 412 (1966). See, e.g., Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp.
683 (D.D.C. 1960), jurisdictional question postponed, 365 U.S. 808 (1961) (expatriation

for remaining outside the United States is cruel and unusual punishment). But see, e.g.,
Matter of Coffey, 123 Cal. 522, 56 Pac. 448 (1899) (disbarment for conviction of extortion
not cruel or unusual punishment).
16 See, e.g., Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 185, 349 P.2d
974 (1960). The plaintiff in this case was one of the plaintiffs in Otsuka.
17 Application of Merino, 23 N.J. Misc. 159, 42 A.2d 469 (1945) (upholding a constitutional disqualification for persons "convicted of a crime'); Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan.
594, 37 Pac. 15 (1894) (upholding a constitutional disqualification for persons "who [have]
ever voluntarily borne arms against the government of the United States'); State ex rel.
Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934) (dictum supporting voter disqualification for conviction); Cf. State ex rel. Barnett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d
787 (1943); Sheridan v. Gardner, 347 Mass. 8, 196 N.E.2d 303 (1964); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 81 S.W.2d 419 (1935); Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Idaho
403, 31 Pac. 793 (1892); Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884). Contra, Huber v. Reily,
53 Pa. 112 (1866) (denying deserters the right to vote imposed a penalty and was unconstitutional).
ISGray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Lassiter v. Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
19 64 Adv. Cal. at 660, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290, 414 P.2d at 418. The convictions of
the plaintiffs were over twenty years old. It was pointed out in the appellants' brief
that they could live another forty or fifty years but they would never be able to vote.
Brief for Appellant, p. 20, Otsuka v. Hite, supra.
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the right to vote by court order after completing probation, 20 or by executive pardon following a prison term,21 the court felt that the objection to
permanent disfranchisement was invalid. Plaintiffs, having been convicted
of federal crimes, had available to them procedures under federal law for
22
regaining the right to vote by means of an executive pardon.
In answer to the argument stressing modem penological theory and
legislation directed toward rehabilitation of criminals, the court found
that the aims of modem penology were satisfied by administrative procedures restoring the right to vote 2 3-the same rationale used to justify disfranchisement for an indefinite period.
The court agreed with the contentions that the provision was overbroad
in its inclusion of offenses and that the classification was unreasonable if
held to include all felonies. Classifications must be reasonable in light of
their purposes; 24 thus offenses which are disqualifying must be related to
the ability to exercise the elective franchise. The court noted that many
felonies, although serious crimes, do not threaten the "integrity of the
elective process." Finding that violation of the Selective Service Act was
among those felonies unrelated to the elective process and not involving
"moral corruption and dishonesty," the court held that plaintiffs had not
been convicted of infamous crimes and should not be disfranchised.
The history of the provision 25 demonstrates that infamous crime had
20 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4.
21 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 4852.01-.17.

2228 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.9 (1962).
23 See note 10 supra.
24 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965).
25The term "infamous crime" first appeared in our Constitution of 1849,
which similarly declared in article II, section 5, that "No idiot or insane
person, or person convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to the
privileges of an elector." "Infamous crime" was not further defined in the
Constitution, but the first session of the Legislature soon filed the gap. Article
II of "An Act to Regulate Elections," passed on March 28, 1850, dealt with
the qualifications and disabilities of electors. Section 12 thereof was identical
with the just-quoted provision of article H, section 5, of the Constitution of
1849; and section 14 declared, "A crime shall be deemed infamous which is
punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state prison." (Comp. Laws
of Cal. (1850-1853), ch. 140, p. 775.) For 22 years that definition of "infamous
crime" remained on the statute books. In 1872, however, the election laws
of 1850 and intervening years were superseded by the new Political Code.
Section 1084 of that code restated the general disqualification that "No idiot
or insane person, or person convicted of any infamous crime, is entitled to the
privilege of an elector." But the statutory definition of "infamous crime" was
not reenacted in the new code, nor was any substitute definition provided.
Seven years later the adoption of the Constitution of 1879 further complicated
matters. Article I, section 1, of the new Constitution repeated the nowfamiliar general language denying the right to vote to persons "convicted of
any infamous crime." . . . 64 Adv. Cal. at 663, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 291, 414 P.2d
at 419.
In 1960, California voters rejected a constitutional amendment which would have
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always been equated with "any felony," a definition having simplicity of
application as its only virtue. The Otsuka majority followed the principle
of construction that where a provision of the California Constitution is
capable of two constructions, "one of which would cause a conflict with
the federal constitution, the other must be adopted." 2 6 The court brought
the disqualification within the ambit of constitutionality by redefining an
infamous crime to be "such that he who has committed it may reasonably
be deemed to constitute a threat to the integrity of the elective process." 27
It is now clear that bona fide conscientious objectors who are convicted
under the Selective Service Act of failure to report for induction are not
convicted of an infamous crime.28 What other crimes are infamous is left in
question. The decision dictates only that "the inquiry must focus more
precisely on the nature of the crime itself." 29 Uncertainty in the new definition has created serious practical problems for those charged with registration of voters and for prospective registrants.
Both the majority and the dissent in Otsuka anticipated that the decision
would cause some confusion. A footnote in the majority opinion says,
We perceive no real danger that, as intimated by defendant, registrars of
voters throughout the state will be flooded by applications of ex-felons and
burdened by a discretion to determine whether their crimes were of a nature
to disfranchise them under the views here expressed. That issue remains ultimately a judicial one, and the Legislature has provided a special procedure
for resolving it. (Elec. Code, § 350.) In any event, "States may not casually
deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the state." (Carringtonv. Rash (1965).... 380 U.S. 89, 96).30
The California Elections Code permits persons who have been refused
registration to bring an action in superior court to compel their registration.31 Does the court intend that registrars should continue to refuse to
register all former felons and force them to bring an action to show that
their conviction would not make them a "threat to the integrity of the
elective process"? Such interpretation is unreasonable. Some felonies are
removed the prohibition of eligibility to vote from those convicted of infamous crimes.
The voters were aware that persons convicted of felonies lost privileges as electors at
that time and voted to retain the provisions as then construed. See Analysis by the
Legislative Counsel of the State of California, Proposed Amendments to Constitution,
Ballot Pamphlet 8 (1960).
26 64 Adv. Cal. at 663, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 291, 414 P.2d at 419.
27 Id. at 667, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 294, 414 P.2d at 422.
25 d. at 671, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 297, 414 P.2d at 425.
29 Id. at 667, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 294, 414 P.2d at 422.
30 Id. at 667 n.13, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 294 n.l3, 414 P.2d at 422 n.13.
81 CAL. ELECTIONS CODE

§ 350.
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obviously irrelevant to one's capacity to vote.3 2 The standard set by the
court in Otsuka is a subjective one. If fully implemented it would demand
an examination into each individual case. The decision makes it necessary
for registrars of voters to take immediate action to change their present
practices 3 but even if registrars are able to set up an objective yardstick
and instruct their deputies in its application, there will be no assurance
of uniformity among the counties of the state. If the counties differ in
their interpretations of the law, a disfranchised voter might argue that he
is being denied equal protection of the laws.
Problems are raised for the registrant as well. First, in registering to
vote, he is likely to be misled for he must sign an affidavit stating, "I am
not disqualified to vote by reason of a felony conviction."3 4 An uninformed
ex-felon would assume that any felony conviction disqualifies a person
from voting.3 5 Second, Elections Code procedures do not provide the registrant with an efficient means of determining his eligibility to vote. Few
people can afford the time and expense of litigation to determine their

eligibility. And even the referral of "questionable" cases to the main office
of the registrar is a complication most persons would rather avoid.30 Thus,
32 E.g., seduction under promise of marriage (CAL. PEN. CODE § 268); failure to
provide family support (CAL. PEN. CODE § 270); wife-beating (CAL. PEN. CODE § 273d);
second-offense indecent exposure (CAL. PEN. CODE § 311); and conspiracy to commit a
misdemeanor (CAL. PEN. CODE § 182(1)).
33 In an attenmpt to find a workable test to determine who is to be registered, the
Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters is compiling a list of all felonies. Upon completion the list will be submitted to the county counsel, who will advise the registrar
which felonies under the holding in Otsuka v. Hite are, in his opinion, grounds for disfranchisement. Interview with Mr. James Allison, Office of Los Angeles County Registrar
of Voters, in Los Angeles, August 16, 1966.
34 CAL. EI.x-.rxONS CODE §§ 310, 321.
35 In the opinion of the county counsel, the requirement that a registrant sign an
affidavit indicating he is not disqualified to vote by reason of a felony conviction can
be applied consistently with the holding in Otsuka. The affidavit merely means that "I
am not disqualified to vote by reason of a felony conviction for a crime which makes me
a threat to the integrity of the elective process." Persons determining for themselves,
based on instructions given to the deputies, that they are not disqualified can sign the
affidavit in good faith. Interview with Mr. Edward H. Gaylord, Assistant County Counsel,
Los Angeles County, in Los Angeles, August 16, 1966.
The irony of allowing registrants to determine for themselves whether or not they
are eligible to vote is that the same people who are thought "dishonest" or "morally
corrupt" and therefore a "threat to the elective process" are made judges of their own
capabilities as voters. Establishment of more concrete and objective standards for registrars is further necessitated by CAL. ELxONS CODE § 389 requiring the "affidavits of
registration of all voters ... convicted of an infamous crime .... " to be cancelled yearly.
There is an annual review of persons registered at which time the registration of those
convicted of infamous crimes is cancelled. This review is carried on in the clerk's or
registrar's office and cannot rely on the individual recognizance of the registrant.
3S Interview, supra note 82. Mr. Allison acknowledges that persons who have been
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present law is inconsistent with the goal of giving potential voters the
fullest opportunity to register.
Disqualification of persons convicted of felonies is a remnant of the
period in which only the propertied male members of society were allowed
to vote.3 When fewer than l0%3s of the population were granted the
privilege, 39 disqualification of criminals did not appear unreasonable. As
the franchise has been consistently extended, however, disqualifications
have become increasingly discriminatory and subject to challenge on equal
protection grounds, for increased participation in popular government has
changed the character of voting from privilege to right and has also decreased any supposed danger to the elective process from relatively small
groups.
Further, the California Supreme Court has acknowledged that rehabilitation is a paramount consideration in the treatment of criminals, 40 and
effective rehabilitation seems to require the termination of unnecessary
punitive disabilities. Ex-convict status is itself a severe hindrance to an
individual's readjustment to society and needs to be offset by the maximum
restoration of civil rights consistent with public safety. 41 If an individual
is permitted and encouraged to register his preferences in selection of political leaders and public policies, his identification with persons who seek
convicted and have served time for a crime would rather forego registration than become
involved with an inquiry to "the authorities." There are some inquiries, however. On
the day of the interview Mr. Allison received a call from a person who had been convicted of auto theft and wished to register. Mr. Allison determined on the spot that
this was not an "infamous crime" under the holding in Otsuka and authorized the
person's registration. Ibid. In a subsequent interview on November 23, 1966, Mr. Allison
stated that he had received approximately 50 such telephone calls since Otsuka was
decided.
37 MCGOvNEY, op. cit. supra note 3 at 1-17.
38 See SToREY, OUR UNALmNABLE RIGHTS 47 (1965), where it is estimated that between two and ten per cent of the colonial population voted.
39 "To the Founding Fathers, the suffrage was not at all a natural right but rather
was a privilege granted the citizen by the grace of the sovereign, namely the state." Ibid.
40 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 687, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 167, 349
P.2d 974, 983 (1960). Cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402
(1950).
41 RuIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 638-44. In Colorado, Idaho, Oklahoma, Indiana,
Maine, Michigan, and Vermont convicts are only disfranchised during the period of
confinement. McGOVNEY, op. cit. supra note 3 at 55. In nearly every jurisdiction convicts
may not vote during imprisonment. It is not certain whether the motive for this is
protection of society or part of the penal process designed to remind the criminal of
the importance of his civil rights. It has been suggested that disfranchisement during
confinement ought to be done away with as a step toward eliminating the lack of contact with the outside world which is "destructive of morale and personal confidence."
RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 2 at 622. After Otsuka, the only impediment to registration of
a convict during imprisonment would seem to be a lack of registrars in the prison.
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to attain personal objectives in an orderly and peaceful manner is likely
42
to be increased and his frustrations diminished.
In California there had been only one judicially recognized meaning for
the term "infamous crime," but the court formulated another, so that there
were two "possible meanings," and then chose the meaning which made the
provision constitutional. The principle of construction that statutes should
be upheld by interpreting them in a manner consistent with the federal constitution perhaps should not be applied where redefinition by the court cannot furnish guidelines for future decisions. Indeed, the meaning selected
by the court to uphold the provision is itself not unlike statutes which
have been held "void for vagueness." 43 Although statutes have been voided
for vagueness most often where they have limited freedom of speech, the
same reasoning would seem applicable to ambiguous attempts to limit the
right to vote. In the free speech cases the courts could have attributed
constitutional meanings to restrictive statutes but instead chose to remove
any possibility of improper application. Desirable conduct, whether it is
voting or other forms of expression of one's opinions, is deterred by a
vague law. On the other hand, invalidation of the provision on equal protection grounds would have required a more immediate and thorough inquiry by the legislature into the relationship between past criminal activity
and the franchise. This approach seems preferable in that it would have
avoided the problems of decentralized administrative interpretation and
deterrence of prospective registrants through vagueness created by Otsuka's
attempt to supply a constitutional meaning.
42 Ibid.; CALDWELL, CRIMINOLOGY

670 (2d ed. 1965); McGOVNEY, op. cit. supra note 3

at 53-54.

43E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91,
168 P.2d 706 (1946); Katzev v. Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 390 (1960). Cf.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The statutes involved in the free speech
cases were penal in nature. Civil statutes have been also invalidated on findings that they
were uncertain. Seaboard Acc. Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 5 P.2d 882 (1931); Small v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d
17 (1948); Bess v. Park, 144 Cal. App. 2d 798, 301 P.2d 978 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
The Otsuka court acknowledged that a voting qualification must adhere to the dictates of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Although the court found
that article II, § 1 is not a penalty, it did not deny that disfranchisement is similar
to penal laws in its effect on a person's rights. The United States Supreme Court and
the California Supreme Court have made it clear that they recognize the importance
of the right to vote and are "zealous" to protect it. E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1959); Fort v. Civil Service Commission, 61 Cal. 2d
331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964); Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 536,
127 P.2d 889 (1942); Britton v. Board of Election, 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac. 115 (1900); Spier
v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 34 (1922). If the right to vote is to be treated with particular care, it seems that the judicial intolerance of questionable penal statutes based
on the importance of their sanctions ought to be applied to unclear voting disqualifications.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Since the court did not so act but instead redefined the provision, those

problems wait final solution by constitutional revision, statutory changes
by the legislature, or further court action. 44
44 The Constitution Revision Commission, presently involved in a major overhaul
of the California Constitution, might undertake clarification and revision of voting disqualifications of ex-convicts. The most progressive revision would delete all disfranchising provisions applicable to ex-convicts. However, there is a stumbling block in the
form of public approval necessary to adopt the revision. In order to facilitate a major
revision it is desirable to include as much revision as possible in a proposition presented to the voters. The commission would not be anxious to include changes which
are not politically efficacious, thereby jeopardizing the whole revision.
To minimize opposition to a revision it might be necessary to first enact legislation
aimed at persons convicted of specific crimes. This would be done under article XX, § 11
which directs the legislature to make laws to exclude from the right of suffrage persons
convicted of "high crimes."
Legislative action is needed even if constitutional revision does result, for it will
be 1968 before the next opportunity to submit the revision to the voters. The need for
clarification is present. Decision by the registrars of each county as to which crimes are
to be the basis of disfranchisement gives rise to equal protection problems. Besides the
need for statewide uniformity, the difficulties resulting from vague laws are present.
Prospective registrants will be deterred from attempting to register and persons will be
denied registration on the basis of questionable administrative decisions. That there are
procedures for compelling registration wrongfully denied does not obviate the evils of
a vague law.
An alternative to legislation might be an attorney general's opinion. Such an opinion does not have the force of a law or decision but is a point of reference for administrative officials. See CAL. Govr. CODE § 12519.

